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I.  Project Abstract
Computational laboratories (CLs) are computational frameworks that permit
the study of complex system behaviors by means of controlled and
replicable experiments. This ongoing project involves the development of
CLs as computer-based instructional materials for an agent-based
computational economics (ACE) course, Econ 308.  ACE is the
computational study of economies modeled as evolving systems of
autonomous interacting agents with learning capabilities.
Under Phase I of this project (Spring 2003 LASCAC Award), two CLs were
developed that capture the salient features of two renowned social science
experiments. The first is Thomas  Schelling's experiments with a
checkerboard model of city segregation.  The second is Robert  Axelrod's
"prisoner's dilemma" (PD) game tournament, in which PD game strategies
solicited from game experts from all over the world were pitted against one
another in repeated round-robin play.  The first CL was completed and web
published; the second CL was brought to a beta (testing) stage of
completion.
Under Phase II of this project (Spring 2004 LASCAC Award), the Axelrod
Tournament CL was completed and web published, and the development of
a new, much more ambitious CL has been undertaken.  This latter CL
involves the construction of a "Hash-and-Beans Economy" in which hash
and bean firms must learn to compete successfully for customers through
appropriate pricing and production strategies in order to survive and prosper.
The projected completion date for this third CL is December 2004.
  Project Objectives
The objective of this project (Phase I and Phase II) has been the
development of computational laboratories ( CLs) as computer-based
instructional materials for Econ 308. The focus of Econ 308 is Agent-Based
Computational Economics (ACE), the computational study of economies
modeled as evolving systems of autonomous interacting agents with learning
capabilities.  The topics covered in Econ 308 include: the complexity of
decentralized market economies; design and use of computational
laboratories; learning and the embodied mind; network economics; and
experimental studies of specific types of market processes (labor, financial,3
electricity...).
1  This interdisciplinary LAS course is now cross-listed as a
regular spring offering under the Economics Program and under the Human-
Computer Interaction (HCI) Graduate Program.
The expectation for Phase I of this project was that the  Schelling
Segregation Model CL and the Axelrod Tournament CL would permit Econ
308 students to develop and run interesting experiments involving complex
system behaviors, even if they had no programming background.  These
experiments would give all students a hands-on introduction to complex
system behaviors in simple social settings, prior to undertaking the more
difficult study of decentralized market economies.  This expectation was
fully met.  Both CLs were successfully used as integral parts of introductory
take-home exercises and as platforms for course project use by several
student teams.
The expectation for Phase II of this project is that the Hash-and-Beans
Economy CL will permit Econ 308 students to run interesting experiments
involving decision-making under uncertainty in a decentralized market
economy. The intent is to use this CL both for take-home exercises and as a
possible platform for course project use.
III. Project Tasks
1.  Selection of a Programming Assistant: Phase II.  My
programming assistant for Phase I of this Project, selected from among
the fifty applicants who responded to my position announcement, was
Chris Cook, an undergraduate majoring in computer science.  Based on
his excellent performance, I chose Chris to remain as my programming
assistant under Phase II of this project.
2.  Assignment and Oversight of Tasks: Phase II. Under Phase II
of this project, I worked with Chris to complete the computational
laboratory (CL) for the  Axelrod Tournament, including documentation
for web publication.  Currently I am currently working with Chris on the
development of a much more ambitious Hash-and-Beans Economy CL
that we plan to web publish and to submit for journal publication.
II.  Project Plan
                                                       
1 See http://www.econ.iastate.edu/classes/econ308/tesfatsion/syl308.htm for the on-line Econ 308 syllabus.4
As noted above, in spring 2003 I selected Chris Cook to be the Programming
Assistant for Econ 308, funded under my 2003 LASCAC Course
Development grant.  I tasked Chris with the development of two CLs for the
study of two famous social science models: Thomas Schelling's Segregation
Model; and Robert Axelrod's Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma Tournament.
Back in the early 1970s, before the advent of commercially available
personal computers (circa 1974), Harvard professor Thomas Schelling
devised deceptively simple models to investigate ideas on complexity and
self-organization.  In particular, Schelling devised a checkerboard model to
demonstrate how a city comprising agents of two different "classes" (e.g.,
religions, races, ages, castes, etc.), initially highly diversified, might
suddenly "tip'' into a highly segregated city if subjected to a small shock
(e.g., some agents move out).  The interesting aspect of this model is that the
tipping can occur even if each individual agent has only a mild preference
for not becoming isolated among neighbors of a different class. This famous
model is now referred to as the  Schelling Segregation Model, or,
alternatively, as the Schelling Tipping Model.
Chris first developed a CL for the Schelling Segregation Model.  This
Schelling Demo is exceptionally well designed, easy to use, and highly
instructive for students and researchers alike, permitting run-time
visualization of the formation of city segregation patterns.  A particularly
interesting and original contribution of this demo is that Chris generalized
the original two-class Schelling Segregation Model to permit three distinct
classes of agents.
I have used Chris's Schelling Demo for take-home exercise assignments in
my spring 2003 offering of Econ 308 and also in my current offering of this
course.  Students have been delighted with this demo, which has enabled
them to design and run systematic experiments to test all kinds of interesting
segregation hypotheses of their own devising.  For example, one student
team this spring made use of the three-class feature in a highly original way:
green agents were reduced to passive objects by zeroing out their neighbor
preferences, and were then systematically placed around the city as
"obstacles.'' Experiments were then conducted to examine the effects of
these various geographical obstacle configurations on the emergence of
segregation patterns among the remaining two classes of agents (blue and
red).5
Another major component of Econ 308 is a course project requirement.
Students, individually or in teams, engage in ACE research ranging from
literature critiques all the way to the careful design and testing of hypotheses
in the context of an originally constructed ACE framework.  The purpose of
this requirement is to encourage students to get involved in creative,
informative, hands-on computational experiments.  The availability of
suitable CLs plays a critical role in permitting students with no programming
background to undertake course projects of an interesting and challenging
nature.  In addition, the availability of CLs provides illustrative examples to
guide students with programming backgrounds who wish to undertake the
development of new software.
Three student teams in my spring 2003 offering of Econ 308 chose course
projects involving interesting extensions of Chris's Schelling Demo.  One
team experimented with the introduction of "family relationships," another
team introduced a rudimentary housing market, and a third team introduced
preferences for income similarity in addition to class similarity to test the
effects on the resulting segregation patterns.
In spring 2003 Chris also began the development of a CL that captures the
salient features of Axelrod's famous Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma (IPD)
Tournament.  The resulting  Axelrod Tournament Demo is well designed,
easy to use, and highly instructive for students and researchers. Unlike any
previous attempts I have seen to model the Axelrod IPD Tournament, this
demo permits the user to set the payoffs to capture any 2-person game, not
just the Prisoner's Dilemma game, and to set the payoffs asymmetrically so
that different player types have different possible payoffs.  This demo is
being used for two exercises in my current spring 2004 ACE course.  The
objective of these exercises is to teach students about the general
development and use of ACE computational laboratories (Section 3 of the
course) and about the design of learning agents in strategic multi-agent
settings (Section 4 of the course).
IV. Links to Examples of Products from the Project
Chris's Schelling Demo is available for downloading and installation (with
an automated installation wizard that he designed) at the Schelling Demo
Home Page at6
http://www.econ.iastate.edu/tesfatsi/demos/schelling/schellhp.htm
This home page (publicly released through a link at my highly active ACE
Interactive Demonstration Software site
2) now ranks second (out of 2,370
hits) in a Google search on the keywords "Schelling'' and "segregation'' and
is receiving about 200 hits a month.
Chris's Axelrod Tournament Demo is available for downloading and
installation (with an automated installation wizard that he designed) at the
Axelrod Tournament Home Page at
http://www.econ.iastate.edu/tesfatsi/demos/axelrod/axelrodt.htm
Chris is still expanding the non-symmetric payoff capabilities of his Axelrod
Tournament Demo.  Consequently, this demo has not yet been publicly
released for general use.   Its public release is anticipated within two weeks.
                                                       
2 See http://www.econ.iastate.edu/tesfatsi/acedemos.htm